United Nations A/70/952–S/2016/540

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
23 June 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 14 June 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am hereby transmitting for your attention the record of ceasefire violations by the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the State border with Armenia during the month of May (see annex I).*

I am also transmitting for your attention the record of ceasefire violations by the armed forces of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh during the month of May, as registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab Mnatsakanyan
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Circulated in the language of submission only.

16-10215 (E) 290616

Please recycle

Annex I to the letter dated 14 June 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-31 May 2016

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/Shots*
1 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	16	AK, AKM: 72
	Vahan	5	PK: 105
	Chinari	1	SVD: 9
	Paravakar	2	DShK: 30
	Aygepar	1	RPG-7: 1 (Berkaber 1)
	Movses	1	
	Berkaber	6	
2 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush, Syunik Regions	16	AK, AKM: 83
	Daranak	4	PK: 212
	Chambarak	4	SVD: 3
	Chinari	2	DShK: 8
	Paravakar	1	Istiglal: 24 (Yanshak 8; Daranak 16)
	Vazashen	2	SPG-9: 1 (Chambarak 1)
	Kayanavan	1	AGS-17: 1/0 (Kayanavan 1)
	Berkaber	1	
	Agarak	1	
3 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	9	AK: 65
	Kakhakn	2	PK: 50
	Aygedzor	1	SVD: 8
	Chinari	2	Black Arrow: 2 (Kayan 2)
	Aygepar	1	
	Berkaber	2	
	Kayan	1	
4 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	22	AK: 38
	Vahan	10	PK: 218
	Chambarak	2	SVD: 10
	Daranak	1	DShK: 244
	Aygedzor	1	RPG-7: 4 (Aygedzor 3; Berkaber 1)
	Paravakar	1	Istiglal: 50 (Jil 50)
	Aygepar	1	Mortar 60 mm: 2 (Chambarak 2)
	Berqaber	2	
	Vazashen	3	
	Berdavan	1	

Date	Direction	Incidents	Type of weapons/Shots
5 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	16	AK: 51
	Jil	5	PK: 200
	Daranak	4	SVD: 3
	Chinari	2	DShK: 18
	Paravakar	1	Istiglal: 51 (Yanshak 1; Chopurlu 47; Daranak 3)
	Berkaber	4	
6 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	23	AK, AKM: 141
	Aygedzor	4	PK, RPK: 273
	Chinari	1	SVD: 86
	Aygepar	4	DShK, Utyos: 148
	N.Karmiraghbyur	1	Istiglal: 7 (Pambak 7)
	Paravakar	2	Black Arrow: 23 (Pambak 13; Aygedzor 10)
	Movses	1	RPG-7: 4 (Paravakar 1; Vazashen 2; Berkaber 1)
	Voskepar	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Berkaber	2	
	Pambak	5	
7 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	22	AKM: 273
	Chinari	4	PK, RPK: 338
	Movses	3	SVD: 16
	Paravakar	1	DShK: 116
	Vazashen	1	Istiglal: 30 (Pambak 3; Vahan 27)
	Berkaber	1	Black Arrow: 25 (Chinari 25)
	Baghanis	1	Mortar 60 mm: 2 (Chambarak 2)
	Pambak	7	
	Chamabarak	3	
	Vahan	1	
8 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	21	AK: 49
	Chambarak	2	PK: 155
	Vahan	2	SVD: 11
	Ttujur	1	DShK: 10
	Agarak	1	Istiglal: 5 (Ttujur 5)
	Chinari	6	Black Arrow: 52 (Chambarak 15; Ttujur 5; Chinari 20;
	Movses	1	Kayan 2; Agarak 10)
	Aygedzor	2	
	Vazashen	2	
	Berkaber	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Berdavan	2	
9 May	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayoc Dzor, Syunik Regions	18	AK, AKM: 54
			PK, RPK: 375
	Chinari	1	SVD: 10
	Paravakar	1	DShK: 20
	Berkaber	1	Istiglal: 90 (Chambarak 78; Vazashen 12)
	Vazashen	1	Black Arrow: 47 (Chambarak 30; Chinari 1; Vazashen
	Chambarak	9	12; Karchevan 4)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/Shots*
	Pambak	3	Mortar 82 mm: 27 (Chambarak 27)
	Khachik	1	
	Karchevan	1	
10 May	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	13	AK, AKM: 91
	Aygedzor	1	PK, RPK: 471
	Vazashen	1	DShK: 13
	Paravakar	1	Istiglal: 104 (Geghamasar 100; Vahan 4)
	Berdavan	1	Black Arrow: 8 (Geghamasar 8)
	Geghamasar	5	Mortar 60 mm: 4 (Geghamasar 4)
	Vahan	4	Mortar 82 mm: 8 (Geghamasar 8)
11 May	Tavush Region	14	AK: 37
	Aygedzor	2	PK: 232
	Paravakar	3	SVD: 3
	Vazashen	5	DShK, NSVP: 20
	Berkaber	2	Istiglal: 3 (Vazashen 3)
	Berdavan	2	
12 May	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	8	AK: 48
	Vazasen	2	PK: 96
	Berdavan	1	SVD: 6
	Vahan	5	Istiglal: 3 (Vazashen 3)
			Black Arrow: 3 (Vahan 3)
13 May	Tavush, Vayoc Dzor Regions	14	AK, AKM: 111
	Aygedzor	5	PK, RPK: 95
	Chinari	2	DShK: 15
	Movses	1	SVD: 21
	Aygepar	1	Black Arrow: 22 (Aygedzor 18; Chinari 4)
	Paravakar	3	
	Bardzruni	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
14 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	7	AK: 2
	Vahan	4	PK: 174
	Aygedzor	1	DShK: 40
	Paravakar	1	SVD: 4
	Aygehovit	1	Black Arrow: 6 (Aygedzor 6)
			Istiglal: 25 (Vahan 25)
15 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush, Ararat, Vayoc Dzor Regions	8	AK, AKM: 12
			PK, PKM: 85
	Paravakar	1	DShK: 25
	Berkaber	1	SVD: 1
	Koti	1	Black Arrow: 3 (Berkaber 3)
	Tsapatagh	2	
	Barcruni	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
	Yeraskh	1	

Date	Direction	Incidents	Type of weapons/Shots
16 May	Gegharkunik, Tavush Regions	4	PK: 50
	Vahan	1	DShK: 15
	Vazshen	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Berdavan	1	
17 May	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	7	AK: 15
	Chinari	1	PK: 43
	Aygepar	1	DShK: 12
	Vazshen	1	SVD: 1
	Baghanis	1	Black Arrow: 4
	Chambarak	2	
	Karchevan	1	
18 May	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	14	AK: 38
	Paravakar	1	PK: 332
	Berkaber	2	DShK: 10
	Berdavan	4	SVD: 9
	Chambarak	2	Black Arrow: 3 (Agarak 3)
	Vahan	2	Mortar 60 mm: 2 (Chambarak 2)
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Agarak	2	
19 May	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	AKM: 45
	Chinari	1	PK, RPK: 82
	Vazashen	1	SVD: 15
	Ttujur	3	Black Arrow: 3 (Ttujur 3)
20 May	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	21	AK: 13
	Aygedzor	4	PK, RPK: 100
	Chinari	4	SVD: 185
	Aygepar	9	DShK: 130
	N.Karmiraghbyur	1	Black Arrow: 35 (Aygedzor 25; N.Karmiraghbyur 10)
	Movses	2	
	Shaghat	1	
21 May	Tavush Region	1	AKM: 35
	Chinari	1	
22 May	Tavush Region	7	AKM: 71
	Chinari	4	PK: 8
	Paravakar	1	Black Arrow: 7 (Chinari 7)
	Aygehovit	1	
	Berkaber	1	
23 May	Tavush Region	6	AKM: 15
	Chinari	4	RPK: 8
	Aygehovit	1	
	Vazashen	1	
24 May	Tavush Region	1	AKM: 1
	Paruyr Sevak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/Shots*
25 May	Tavush Region	2	AK: 2
	Chinari	1	PK: 10
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
26 May	Tavush Region	2	AK: 4
	Chinari	1	PK: 10
	Aygehovit	1	
27 May	Tavush Region	12	AK: 79
	Chinari	6	PK: 95
	Aygedzor	1	SVD: 46
	Aygepar	1	Black Arrow: 20 (Chinari 20)
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	2	
28 May	Tavush, Syunik Regions	4	AK, AKM: 16
	Chinari	1	PK: 100
	Movses	1	SVD: 2
	Salvard	1	
	Bardzravan	1	
29 May	Tavush, Vayoc Dzor Regions	3	AK: 3
	Vazasen	1	SVD: 3
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Bardzruni	1	
30 May	Tavush, Vayoc Dzor Regions	4	AKM: 12
	Vazashen	3	PK: 15
	Bardzruni	1	SVD: 1
31 May	Tavush Region	8	PK: 145
	Chinari	1	SVD: 6
	Paravakar	1	
	Koti	5	
	Baghanis	1	

Annex II to the letter dated 14 June 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

1-31 May 2016

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/Shots*
1 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	55	AK: 1261 PK: 2325 SVD: 9 DShK: 210 SPG-9: 2 (Yarmja 2) RPG-7: 1 (Tallish 1) Istiglal: 32 (Horadiz 20; m.Karachuk 1; Talish 11) Mortar 60 mm: 1 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 1) Mortar 82 mm: 42 (Taghibeyli 6; Yarmja 36) Mortar 120 mm: 2 (Yarmja 2)
2 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	42	AK: 1055 PK: 515 SVD: 44 DShK: 110 RPG-7: 4 (Talish 4) Istiglal: 5 (Seysulan 5) Mortar 82 mm: 2 (Yarmja 1; Gyulistan 1)
3 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	49	AK: 833 PK: 465 SVD: 14 DShK: 120 Istiglal: 18 (Darchinar 10; Verin Chaylu 8) Mortar 82 mm: 23 (Jraberd 9; Yarmja 9; Seysulan 4; Verin Chaylu 1)
4 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	60	AK:782 PK: 761 SVD: 48 DShK: 20 Istiglal: 11 (Seysulan 2; Verin Chaylu 9) RPG-7: 1 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 1) Mortar 60 mm: 20 (Horadiz 1; Darchinar 1; Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 10; Geytape 2; Seysulan 4; Verin Chaylu 2) Fagot: 2 (Yarmja 2) Mortar 82 mm: 6 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 1; Verin Chaylu 2; Talish 3)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/Shots*
5 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	55	AK: 1153 PK: 1350 SVD: 32 DShK: 110 Istiglal: 20 (Horadiz 1; Seysulan 2; Verin Chaylu 17) RPG-7: 2 (Jraberd 2) Mortar 60 mm: 1 (Seysulan 1) TR-107: 6 (Kiasli 2; Chulu 4)
6 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	49	AK: 1154 PK: 602 SVD; Accuracy: 20 DShK: 97 Istiglal: 25 (Horadiz 5; Qarvend 2; Kurapatkino 10; Seysulan 5; Haterk 3) RPG-7: 2 (Talish 2) Mortar 82 mm: 3 (Seysulan 2; Yarmja 1)
7 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	63	AK: 1876 PK: 2338 SVD: 65 Istiglal: 36 (m. Karachuk 6; Kurapatkino 7; Verin Chaylu 13; Gyulistan 10) RPG-7: 10 (Tallish 10) Mortar 82 mm: 5 (Tallish 5)
8 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	80	AK: 1639 PK: 1200 SVD: 39 DShK: 60 Istiglal: 68 (Mehdili 5; m. Karachuk 16; Kurapatkino 9; Yarmja 8; Tallish 30) Black Arrow: 10 (Marzili 10) RPG-7: 5 (Jraberd 1; Levonarkh 4) AGS-17: 18 (Levonarkh 14; Yarmja 4) Mortar 60 mm: 28 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 5; Jraberd 15; Levonarkh 6; Verin Chaylu 2) Mortar 82 mm: 14 (Namerli 6; Yarmja 2; Seysulan 3; Levonarkh 1; Jraberd 2)
9 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	91	AK: 2344 PK: 1968 SVD: 31 DShK, Utyos: 130 Istiglal: 12 (Seysulan 12) RPG-7: 1 (Levonarkh 1) AGS-17: 21 (Yarmja 5; Tallish 16) Mortar 60 mm: 7 (Levonarkh 5; Tallish 2) Mortar 82 mm: 58 (Levonarkh 39; Jraberd 15; Talish 2; Dastagir 2)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/Shots*
10 May	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	61	AK: 971 PK: 2184 SVD: 52 DShK: 200 AGS-17: 1 (Talish 1) Istiglal: 24 (Bash Qarvend 19; Kurapatkino 5) Mortar 60 mm: 15 (Jraberd 2; Levonarkh 4; Namerli 8; Seysulan 1) Mortar 82 mm: 31 (Horadiz 3; Seysulan 10; Jraberd 6; Verin Chaylu 12)
11 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	45	AK: 1265 PK: 589 SVD, Vintarez: 78 DShK, Utyos: 50 Istiglal: 20 (Verin Chaylu 10; Talish 10) RPG-7: 7 (Talish 7) Mortar 60 mm: 1 (Talish 1) Mortar 82 mm: 4 (Talish 4)
12 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	58	AK: 2052 PK: 1830 SVD: 47 DShK: 200 Istiglal: 125 (Karakhanbeyli 15; Talish 100; Verin Chaylu 10) AGS-17: 10 (m. Karachuk 10) Mortar 60 mm: 2 (Seysulan 1; Jraberd 1) Mortar 82 mm: 19 (Namerli 16; Yarmja 2; Shurabad 1) GP-25: 1 (Talish 1)
13 May	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	60	AK: 1901 PK: 1960 SVD, Vintarez: 57 DShK, Utyos, NSVP: 40 Istiglal: 11 (Talish 4; Verin Chaylu 7) RPG-7: 3 (Tallish 3) Mortar 60 mm: 2 (Seysulan 1; Yarmja 1) Mortar 82 mm: 33 (Levonarkh 5; Yarmja 16; Seysulan 5; Talish 7) Mortar 120 mm: 3 (Levonarkh 3)
14 May	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	101	AK: 1476 PK: 512 SVD: 114 DShK: 2 Istiglal: 10 (Verin Chaylu 10) Black Arrow: 10 (Kurapatkino 10) RPG-7: 2 (Levonarkh 2) AGS-17: 30 (Nuzger 12; m. Karachuk 6; Yarmja 10; Jraberd 2)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/Shots*
			Mortar 60 mm: 54 (Ashagi Abdurakhmanli 3; Darchinar 1; Seysulan 16; Yarmja 2; Jraberd 9; Levonarkh 10; Verin Chaylu 10; Talish 3) Mortar 82 mm: 138 (Taghibeyli 12; Seysulan 50; Yarmja 30; Levonarkh 38; Jraberd 7; Gyulistan 1) ZSU-23-2: 30/0 (Ashagi Abdurakhmanli 30)
15 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	59	AK: 3315 PK: 1195 SVD: 77 DShK: 54 Istiglal: 44 (Mehdili 40; Nuzger 4) AGS-17: 79 (Nuzger 75; Karakhanbeyli 4) BMP-2: 4 (Nuzger 4)
16 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	67	AK: 3380 PK: 1612 SVD: 87 DShK: 646 Istiglal: 49 (Nuzger 8; Mehdili 30; Yusifjanli 1; Kengerli 10) AGS-17: 16 (Mehdili 2; Horadiz 12; Nuzger 2) Mortar 60 mm: 2 (Seysulan 2) Mortar 82 mm: 2 (Yarmja 1; Gyulistan 1)
17 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	48	AK: 1270 PK: 695 SVD, Vintarez: 27 DShK, Utyos: 271 Istiglal: 25 (Mehdili 11; Horadiz 7; Nuzger 4; Verin Chaylu 3) AGS-17: 32 (Nuzger 24; karakhanbeyli 5; m. Karachuk 3) Mortar 60 mm: 16 (m. Karachuk 16) BMP-2: 30 (m. Karachuk 30)
18 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	23	AK: 952 PK: 335 SVD: 16 Istiglal: 19 RPG-9: 2 (Talish 2) Mortar 60 mm: 3 (Seysulan 3)
19 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	10	AK: 317 PK: 180
20 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	6	AK: 147 PK: 27 SVD: 2 DShK: 5

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/Shots*
21 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	9	AK: 107 PK: 4 Istiglal: 10 (Gyulistan 10)
22 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	4	AK: 46 PK: 220
23 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	6	AK: 39 PK: 55
24 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	6	AK: 45 PK: 125 SVD: 15 DShK: 15
25 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	2	AK: 5 SVD: 8
26 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	16	AK: 142 SVD: 301 DShK: 3 AGS-17: 3 (Nuzger 3) Istiglal: 5 (Nuzger 1; Marzili 1; Verin Chaylu 3)
27 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	7	AK: 58 PK: 17 SVD: 3
28 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	11	AK: 107 PK: 80
29 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	14	AK: 191 PK: 40 SVD: 2 Istiglal: 5 (Mehdili 3; Nuzger 2) Mortar 60 mm: 4 (Horadiz 4)
30 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	12	AK: 224 SVD: 5 Istiglal: 4 (m. Karachuk 4)
31 May	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	7	AK: 71 SVD: 8

From 1 to 31 May, 4 soldiers of the NKR Defense Army were killed and 12 soldiers were wounded from Azerbaijani side.

United Nations A/70/953

General Assembly

Distr.: General
16 June 2016

Original: English

Seventieth session
Agenda item 28 (b)
Social development: social development, including questions relating to the world social situation and to youth, ageing, disabled persons and the family

Letter dated 15 April 2016 from the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on Ageing to the President of the General Assembly

I am writing to you in my capacity as Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on Ageing, which was established by the General Assembly through its resolution 65/182 for the purpose of strengthening the protection of the human rights of older persons.

In that regard, I refer to paragraphs 47 and 48 of General Assembly resolution 69/146 on the follow-up to the Second World Assembly on Ageing, by which, among other things, the Assembly called upon Member States to continue to contribute to the work of the Open-ended Working Group on Ageing, in particular by presenting concrete proposals, practical measures, best practices and lessons learned that would contribute to promoting and protecting the rights and dignity of older persons, in order to enable it to fulfil its mandate, and requested the Working Group to submit a compilation of the above-mentioned proposals and measures at the seventieth session.

In that regard, I wish to inform you that a compilation of contributions received is available at http://social.un.org/ageing-working-group/sixtsession-proposals.shtml.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 28 (b).

(*Signed*) Mateo **Estreme**
Chair
Open-ended Working Group on Ageing

16-10131 (E) 200616

Please recycle

United Nations A/70/954–S/2016/548

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
20 June 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34 (a)
Prevention of armed conflict: prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 16 June 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Since my country was mentioned in your remarks made at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum on 16 June 2016 as well as during your meetings with Russian high-level officials, I would like to draw your attention to the following facts.

It is the Russian Federation that unleashed hybrid war against Ukraine by the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and further military aggression in Donbas. These violations of the Charter of the United Nations and international law were condemned by the whole international community. The General Assembly, in its resolution 68/262, has underscored that the so-called referendum in Crimea has no validity and cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

It is the Russian Federation that continues to trigger the military activities in Donbas by supplying weapons, military forces and ammunition. These facts were confirmed by many international organizations, including the United Nations. According to the latest report on the human rights situation in Ukraine of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "the conflict broke out in spring 2014 with the influx of foreign fighters, including citizens of the Russian Federation, ammunition and heavy weaponry into east Ukraine from across the border with the Russian Federation".

It is the Russian Federation that is continuously opposing the request of Ukraine to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Ukraine as well as the implementation of your noble idea of establishing a United Nations support office in Ukraine.

It is the Russian Federation that, according to the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, violates human rights in Crimea by illegal arrests, "the imposition of a new legal framework restrictive of civil liberties, abductions and disappearances, the shutting down of opposition media outlets and the silencing of dissenting voices through the initiation of

Please recycle

repressive measures, including abusive criminal proceedings, targeting mainly pro-Ukrainian activists and Crimean Tatar institutions".

Finally, it is the Russian Federation that, by violation of the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Budapest on 5 December 1994, and by violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, undermined the non-proliferation process in the whole world, as you yourself once noted. Moreover, it unilaterally denounced the agreement with Ukraine on the status and conditions of deployment of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine of 28 May 1997 with a possible view to renewing, at this flourishing seaside resort, two base complexes for nuclear-weapon maintenance, which constitutes a serious challenge to the existing non-proliferation regime and must be tackled by the international community. We have also received evidence that the Russian Federation has deployed means of delivery of nuclear weapons and has been renovating relevant infrastructure on Ukrainian soil in Crimea.

Taking all this into account, we call upon you to take into consideration official United Nations documents, as well as continuous aggressive actions by the Russian Federation in Ukraine that caused more than 10,000 deaths and more than 1.8 million internally displaced persons in Ukraine, while evaluating the role of the Russian Federation in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and human rights protection.

We cannot accept your public praising of the "role of the Russian Federation in ending conflict in Ukraine" and would appreciate clarification of such a position.

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/70/955–S/2016/547

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
23 June 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 71
Right of peoples to self-determination

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 15 June 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the Chair's summary of a colloquium on the theme of reconciling self-determination and territorial integrity: models of self-governance as tools to promote peace and stability in Europe, which was held in Triesenberg, Liechtenstein, from 20 to 22 March 2016 (see annex).

The discussion among academics, experienced mediators and diplomats was aimed at considering new and innovative ways of thinking about self-determination that do not equate it with independence or secession, in particular, in the context of ongoing conflicts in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe area. The meeting was held in collaboration with the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University, and was informal and off-the-record in nature.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 71.

(*Signed*) Christian Wenaweser
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-10666 (E) 300616

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 15 June 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Colloquium on reconciling self-determination and territorial integrity: models of self-governance as tools to promote peace and stability in Europe Chair's summary

Triesenberg, Liechtenstein, 20-22 March 2016

Introduction

The first initiative of Liechtenstein upon joining the United Nations in 1990 was to explore innovative approaches to the implementation of the right of self-determination.[1] Reigning Prince Hans Adam II pioneered the idea of establishing a United Nations convention on the self-determination of peoples, inspired by the vision that conflicts should be decided on the basis of international law and the will of the people affected, without resorting to violence. Under the draft convention, each State party would undertake to "respect the aspirations of all communities within its territory to an appropriate degree of self-administration". In the draft, progressive levels of self-administration are envisaged for communities living within States, supported by international arrangements designed to mediate and settle differences, under international monitoring, with the goal of preventing, defusing and ending conflict, especially armed conflict. Independence through secession would be considered a last resort and only with the consent of the State. However, after a lively debate in 1992, the General Assembly decided at the time to defer consideration of the proposal.

As numerous conflicts within States as well as frozen conflicts remain unresolved — including in Europe — an open debate about contentious self-determination claims is of continued urgency and relevance. To that end, an eminent group of senior diplomats, mediators, experts, policy practitioners and scholars participated, upon the joint invitation of the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations in New York and the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University[2] in a colloquium in Triesenberg, Liechtenstein. The goal of the meeting was to explore the ongoing tensions between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity, to explore ways of reconciling the two and to consider the possibilities for innovative application of the right of self-determination as a tool for conflict prevention and resolution.

Hereditary Prince Alois of Liechtenstein and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Miroslav Lajčák, delivered keynote addresses at the meeting, which was co-chaired by the Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations in New York, Christian Wenaweser, and the Director of the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber.

[1] For the full text of the convention, see Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, *The Self-Determination of Peoples: Community, Nation, and State in an Interdependent World* (2002), pp. 365-392.

[2] For more information, visit https://lisd.princeton.edu/.

Summary of discussions

Discussions focused on the following three thematic areas:

(a) The historical development of the principle and right of self-determination, and its legal foundations, challenges and limitations;

(b) The principle's application as a conflict prevention and resolution mechanism in specific situations in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) area;

(c) Practical ideas about how to advance the debate about self-determination in the future.

A brief summary of each of the discussions follows below. The colloquium took place under the Chatham House Rule.

General discussion: reconciling the principles of self-Determination and territorial integrity

Key questions in the discussion included the relevance of the principle of self-determination in contemporary international law and international relations and the difficulties in reconciling it with the principle of territorial integrity. In addition, the participants were encouraged to think of emerging opportunities and challenges for the right of self-determination in its various forms during a time of changes in the international order.

Participants observed that the self-determination debates today were not confined solely to the realm of academia. The events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine were referred to as the most recent example of the concept's relevance to modern-day politics and conflicts. In addition, the self-determination principle has an enduring historical relevance. Its ideas can be traced back to the United States Declaration of Independence, United States President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations and subsequent decolonization efforts, and the International Covenants on Human Rights.

However, self-determination and territorial integrity continue to be among the most sensitive principles in international law. There has been enormous resistance to claims for self-determination by great Powers which have long feared its "empire-destroying capabilities". Also, the two concepts are often seen to be in conflict and difficult to reconcile. The principle of territorial integrity determines the very existence of a State. It is a basic pillar of international law that States are willing to defend, if necessary, by armed force. Self-determination, on the other hand, is subject to different interpretations. While some hold that it is a right that is exercised only once, at the moment when a State reaches independence, others are of the view that it is exercised regularly and on an ongoing basis. The question of who is entitled to the right (i.e., the notion of "peoples", and in particular the designation of indigenous peoples) has been discussed intensely and in different contexts and invoked in exceptional circumstances. It is a dynamic principle which ultimately also determines whether the State can develop independently and according to its own ideas of governance.

Some participants challenged the perceived difficulty in reconciling the two principles. It was posited that the drafters of the Charter of the United Nations included both principles in the text on an equal standing and thus did not consider

them to be incompatible. Typically, friction emerges only when the disputing parties cannot agree on which of the principles should take precedence in a given case. This creates a need for more defined rules and tools to manage territorial integrity and self-determination claims.

Some participants suggested that the international community, in particular the Security Council of the United Nations, should act as an arbitrator in situations involving self-determination claims. Others, however, challenged the idea that the Security Council can be a fair adjudicator since it typically only reflects the will of its five permanent members. Also, they observed that in the past some of the Security Council Powers have relied on the principle of self-determination to justify their "hegemonic interests".

Others pointed out the need to examine modern-day self-determination challenges in a manner which takes into account changing global realities, mainly fuelled by globalization, the weaker role of nation-States, the more prominent role of regions and regional integration, and the empowerment of the individual as a result of advances in technology. The twenty-first century is characterized by a growing influence of transnational ideas and networks, which in turn have implications for the exercise of sovereign rights, the character of political communities, and the meaning of boundaries. There was a call to move away from the State-based approach in international law to an individual-centred system — "determination of the self". In particular, participants underlined the need to include the voices of people living in places coping with self-determination challenges. These people often have a much more realistic view on how to work out the differences than diplomats.

It was also suggested that the behaviour of the State facing self-determination claims is often problematic, and prompts communities to challenge its authority and seek different governance arrangements. A participant pointed out that in many conflicts there was a lack of generosity of the State towards the community it wants to keep integrated. It was therefore legitimate to ask at what point a State abrogates its right to govern its territory.

Some also wondered how the dynamics of self-determination claims change once a party to the dispute resorts to violence and the use of force to achieve its goals. Claims for self-determination, often accompanied by the threat of use of force, may mask criminal networks pursuing commercial and business interests. Therefore, they suggested greater scrutiny of the groups seeking decentralization, greater levels of self-governance and sometimes independence.

While there are numerous examples of successful resolution of self-determination claims in the recent history of Europe (e.g., peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia as well as Serbia and Montenegro), participants stressed that the legal and political context was still not ripe to resolve other, sometimes protracted, crises resulting from self-determination claims (e.g., Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh). Many of these situations have led to stagnation in terms of good governance, justice, combating corruption and accountability. Therefore, new tools to mediate these conflicts must also focus on establishing a linkage between achieving peace and pursuing reforms.

Country-specific discussion

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The discussion was framed in the context of the viability and effectiveness of the Dayton Accords unique model of self-governance for the country's distinct communities, which ended war but did not bring peace. Overcoming "negative peace" and ensuring the functionality of the State also featured as prominent themes throughout the debate.

Participants generally agreed that the Dayton Accords had achieved their main goal, namely, ending the armed conflict. But it was also noted that the inflexible nature of the Accords continued to stifle the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was consequently not conducive to the country's long-term security and stability. A participant characterized the Accords as "a mechanism of blockage", which prevented decisive action by the Government and was in part responsible for limited development gains in the last decade. It is therefore unsurprising that people had sought alternative visions of the future. Concerns were expressed about radicalizing tendencies in the country, often fuelled by outside actors, including the growing influence of Da'esh.

Another more fundamental problem regarding the sources of sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina surfaced in the debate. It was pointed out that the central authorities believed that the country's sovereignty came from the international recognition of the State, while the authorities in Republika Srpska viewed it differently. They believed that the legitimacy of the State relied on the consent from the citizens of the two entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), and clung to their right to choose to be a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, a participant suggested, the international community might have to eventually accept that the will of the people in Republika Srpska was not compatible with the aspirations of the population in the Federation and to respect their calls for self-determination. However, this assertion was vehemently challenged by others. They noted that the international community viewed the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as non-negotiable and would continue to defend it. Independence for Republika Srpska would set back development gains and again spark instability in the Balkans. With both Serbia and Croatia as guarantors of the Dayton Accords and having a stake in the stability of the country, the Government of Serbia was not keen to accept Republika Srpska as an independent State or as a part of its territory. Secession by Republika Srpska would therefore be counterproductive and find no support in the international community.

A range of options were suggested as potential solutions to mitigate the dysfunctionality and lack of development due to the difficulties contained in the Dayton Accords. The need for a massive economic recovery plan (similar to the Marshall Plan) coupled with reform of State and local administration was identified as an essential element of progress. Also highlighted was the need to respect the rule of law and to fight corruption.

The European Union and other international organizations, including OSCE and the United Nations, would play an essential role in encouraging these reforms. Some suggested that Bosnia and Herzegovina needed to continue to move forward

at a faster pace towards the European Union, guided by the vision of "less Dayton, more Brussels". Others suggested that the Dayton Accords had to remain intact.

Some participants challenged the notion that the prospect of European Union membership could be an effective catalyst for internal reforms, good governance and economic development, as it was becoming increasingly clear that growing Euroscepticism and opposition to further enlargement across the Union made membership an unrealistic goal. Also, views of the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina differed significantly between Republika Srpska (more negative) and the Federation (generally more positive).

The view was also expressed that the European Union's lack of a comprehensive strategy on Bosnia and Herzegovina had led to the dysfunctionality of the State in the first place, turning Bosnia and Herzegovina into a de facto "failed State". This notion was strongly countered by other participants, who insisted that, while Bosnia and Herzegovina was a weak State, it had still achieved several important advances, including the central Government's control of the entire territory, the establishment of a national defence force, the existence of one currency and low inflation and the issuance of identity cards and biometric passports.

One significant difficulty in advancing the discussions on the future of the country was that Bosnia and Herzegovina no longer featured prominently on the agenda of the international community, mainly due to many competing crises and lack of political will to engage. But participants agreed that much more needed to be done to fully stabilize the country, particularly in reconciling its many communities. One example cited was the issue of "two schools under one roof", which kept students apart on the basis of their ethnicity. Others interpreted this lack of a spotlight on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a positive sign that the country was on the right path to full recovery.

Questions raised for further discussion included: (a) whether and how self-determination principles might be implemented in cases where there was either no amenable constitution, no rule of law, no willingness to accept decentralization or no sense of national solidarity/community; and (b) whether it could be possible to craft a peace agreement which would not block progress and the effective functioning of the State.

Ukraine

In the light of the situation in Ukraine, the participants discussed the complex and controversial nature of the self-determination claims of communities in Crimea and the Donbass region. The discussion centred on the legitimacy of the claims and the true representation of the will of the communities affected.

Participants elaborated on the historical roots of the present conflict in Ukraine. Ottoman influence in the south, Polish and Austrian control in the west and Russian control in the east had created a fractured and contested Ukrainian identity over preceding centuries, with Kiev attempting to maintain a sense of national identity at the geographical centre. Various groups have in turn attempted to impose their version of Ukrainian identity along ethnic or linguistic lines. As a result, Ukraine currently faces the challenge of overcoming these divisive legacies in order to create a new and inclusive national identity.

The roots of the conflict also lie in Ukraine's desire for stability on the one hand and a more transformative, open identity on the other. Yet both ends of this spectrum rely on the connection to State sovereignty as the key to their identity, while suffering from the lack of an inclusive political process, a deficit of political leadership and a weak culture of dialogue in politics and civil society.

Participants thus identified four key causes of the current conflict, which must all be addressed simultaneously:

(a) Geopolitical struggle between the United States and Russia;

(b) Economic tension between the European Union and Russia;

(c) Internal debate about Ukrainian identity;

(d) "Postcolonial syndrome" in the struggle for identity between Russia and Ukraine.

The question of membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also generated disagreement. A pattern has emerged between two stark choices: either total allegiance to the West, or total allegiance to Russia (along the lines of Armenia or Belarus). Some participants argued that the West was irresponsible in falsely promising European Union or NATO membership to States like Ukraine or Georgia, which prevented the establishment of an in-between paradigm and produced "romantics instead of realists". While some maintained that any policy aiming for the membership of Ukraine in NATO would be counterproductive and needlessly antagonistic, others posited that anything other than full Ukrainian membership in Western institutions would be disregarded and violated by Russia. Another view expressed was that there was also a growing scepticism among NATO members themselves about the Ukrainian membership.

The influence of the European Union in the origins and relevance for the resolution of the current conflict in Ukraine remained in dispute. Some argued that the European Union had not contemplated welcoming Ukraine as a new member in the near future and that Russia was in fact not opposed to an eventual Ukrainian European Union membership, as long as the bilateral link with Moscow remained open. Others maintained that the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, while intended by the European Union as a positive trigger for modernization, was not a good deal for Ukraine, and that the European Union also rebuffed President Viktor Yanukovych's requests for financial assistance, forcing him to turn to Russia.

Analysis of the Minsk negotiation and ceasefire process was overwhelmingly negative, and discussions turned to possible trajectories and outcomes of the current conflict. The most favourable scenario envisioned the reintegration of the Donbass, facilitated by Moscow-Washington-Brussels diplomacy and tackling the so-far unaddressed political portions of the Minsk agreement alongside other key questions, such as the future security status of Ukraine and geo-economic issues such as trade agreements.

Another possibility was that of "negative peace", with Ukraine de facto divided for the next decade. Following a reconfirmation of the Helsinki principles, one part under the control of Kiev would reform along European Union standards and principles, while Donbass would exist apart, like Transnistria or Abkhazia.

A third "cold war scenario" posited neither peace nor armed conflict. This worst-case option would be a net negative for European security, as lack of internal reform in Ukraine alongside uncontrolled violence and tension could mean a return to armed conflict at any time. This dangerous state of affairs reflected the current status of the Minsk ceasefire, with continued military and civilian casualties.

In a final scenario, Ukraine would recognize the status of Crimea as part of Russia and decentralize control in the Donbass in return for the acceptance by Russia of NATO membership of Ukraine. The West and Russia would then provide aid in the form of a reconstruction package for Ukraine.

Participants expressed various counter-arguments to each of the above outcomes, citing the strength of Ukrainian patriotism and resistance to decentralization, the lack of incentive to reform, particularly while in a state of enhanced antagonism with Russia, and criticism that it would be naïve to expect Russia to uphold any promises made about Ukraine's security status. Many participants argued that Ukraine needed to be told some "hard truths", even if the West wished to hide behind mutual antagonism towards Russia. Many of the current weaknesses and failures of Ukraine were not merely the result of Russian intervention. On the contrary, they were in some instances the result of insufficient political will for reform and the lack of external pressure asking for such reforms. Ukraine did not apply the rule of law, and the Western donor countries did not keep the Government accountable for its failure to do so. Yet, reforming Ukraine, encouraging decentralization and stopping the spread of extreme nationalism was indispensable to creating the basis for future reconciliation and reintegration efforts.

The session concluded with a discussion of potential solutions for the situation in Ukraine. One participant argued that a direct appeal to Ukraine's civil society and business sector was the only way to exert effective pressure on the governing authorities to enact meaningful reform. The Government had to be held accountable for rebuilding State capacity and administration, especially in health care and education, in order to begin to heal the fracturing that was so widespread and detrimental to Ukrainian society. A three-pronged approach was needed to strengthen the economy and other State institutions (in particular the military) simultaneously. At the same time, the Government needed to find a way to work with Russia to cooperate in closing and monitoring the border, a major confidence-building step, alongside demining the conflict zone, facilitating movement across the ceasefire line and people-to-people contact. Another participant argued that Ukraine needed a "Marshall Plan" for economic development, and that civil society should exert strong pressure so that the reforms remained transparent and that there was pressure on politicians to work towards these goals.

It was pointed out that even full implementation of the Minsk agreement would not resolve the core issues. The view was expressed that, unless a power-sharing or participatory agreement was reached with the authorities in de facto control of the Donbass region, disintegration would continue to override attempts at reintegration. At the same time, many argued that self-governance alone would be a "recipe for disaster". Ukraine could not afford "evolutionary change", according to one participant, as the system was so endemically corrupt that any step-by-step reforms would be overwhelmed and negated by the corrosive power of the oligarchy and entrenched corruption. Ukraine required nothing less than "revolutionary change" to address the core internal weaknesses and reposition itself internationally.

Finally, participants were urged to look beyond the European context for global examples of conflict management that might be useful in addressing the unique case of Ukraine. One participant chastised the European tendency to look only at models from their own continent. Ukraine might benefit from creativity in looking at the rest of the world, for example the case of Myanmar, currently transitioning from an authoritarian regime and caught in the geopolitical tension between India and China. While the overall theme of the conference focused on the tension between territorial integrity and self-determination in European case studies, participants agreed that this type of creative thinking and global perspective would be crucial in applying new crisis-management and peacebuilding innovations to seemingly intractable conflicts.

Reflections from other relevant situations

This session provided an opportunity for participants to reflect on a growing number of other situations which feature tensions between self-determination and territorial integrity. In particular, participants were asked to examine a range of options available, or that could be imagined, to address self-determination claims and permit self-governance in a non-violent manner compatible with international law.

Some participants questioned whether the State was the best tool to provide for maintenance of peace and stability, and whether there might be alternatives to achieving this goal, especially since many times in modern history the State had turned against its citizens.

Questions were also raised about the moral underpinnings that drive the desire for self-determination, among them the idea of fairness and the desire of the individual and the people desire to decide their own fate. While the individual and the people are often understood as the driving force behind self-determination in theory, in practice this is not always the case. In many instances, borders and the fates of people were decided by outside Powers (e.g., the Sykes-Picot Agreement).

Therefore, some participants called for the re-interpretation of self-determination that places less emphasis on an ethno-nationalist right of people to have their own country. A participant posited that the time was right to promote the idea of self-determination on an individual level, since many people reject a singular ethnonationalist identity and have multiple identities (and passports). Increasingly it was not just the elites, but also the wider public, which was becoming more cosmopolitan. Some self-determination movements, such as the Catalan government, had been very explicit that their project was not ethnonationalist but inclusive for all (e.g., even the Eritrean Catalans have the right to vote). This trend, however, also had negative effects. There were also negative examples of such transboundary approaches, such as Da'esh, which draws followers and fighters from all corners of the world.

This idea of greater emphasis on individual self-determination was countered by others who reminded the group that despite notions of cosmopolitan identity, one still could not travel without a passport — and a significant number of individuals across the world did not own a passport or in extreme cases did not even have a legal identity. It was re-emphasized that populations in places such as Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Donbass often felt disempowered and threatened by the very same cosmopolitan ideas. Collectivist world views persisted, clinging to the past for a sense of control.

This question was considered to be of particular importance since we live in a time of a drastic repositioning of the geopolitical order. The State and its effective authority remained important means to providing security. However, "virtual self-determination" would become more potent due to advancements in information technology. Going forward, we could not solely rely on States to undertake the diversity of governance roles that were required. Therefore, concerned citizens had to play an active role in transforming their governance structures, sometimes with external support, through third-party entities, and sometimes without. Some maintained that issues of self-determination should be adjudicated at the local level, where actors already existed (e.g., community leaders, local politicians) to facilitate minority-majority dialogue.

Clarity and precision remained essential in discussions of self-determination as an actionable principle of sociopolitical organization and international law, particularly about practical details for self-determination operations as well as different kinds and categories of self-determination. Other questions included: what qualifies a group to be/become a "people"? Do all peoples have the right of self-determination? How can ethnic nationalism be avoided in making this decision? How can criminal elements be excluded from claims to self-determination?

Some participants pointed out that the economy also had to be taken into account when answering some of these questions about self-determination. The alternative demands of groups often went hand in hand with economic marginalization. A participant noted that the setup of the economy, namely, the "ethno-economy", was a major factor in the breakup of Yugoslavia.

The way forward: specific recommendations and next steps

Looking ahead, participants agreed that the discussion in Triesenberg could mark the beginning of renewed efforts to grapple with the concept of self-determination and its implications for European and international peace and security. They also underlined the importance and value of bringing together experts and representatives from the diplomatic, academic and policymaking realms, who all contributed to a spirited debate.

The lack of process and properly equipped institutions to deal peacefully with self-determination claims, the lack of political consensus and the lack of data about various situations were pointed out as deficiencies in the current global system. Therefore, it was suggested that the time was right to expand the discussions beyond academic circles and theoretical debates in order to pursue practical applications of self-determination principles in various situations worldwide.

Several conditions for achieving this goal were considered: first, the persistent controversies surrounding the concept of self-determination had to be addressed head-on. This primarily entailed discounting the commonly accepted idea that giving more rights to people correlated with the dissolution of the State. Second, engaging various stakeholders at/around the United Nations and OSCE could create new political dynamics and help to raise the prominence of the concept. Participants observed that serious debate about self-determination in the international arena had languished since the 1990s, either because it had not been a high-priority issue for many States or because it was considered highly controversial.

Opinions were, however, split about the geographic scope of the debates. Some advocated for discussing self-determination claims globally, considering that many contemporary self-determination claims occurred outside of Europe. Others expressed interest in primarily focusing on issues in Europe and its neighbourhood, since it was presumptuous to "tell the world how to do things", having not addressed properly all the self-determination challenges in Europe, in particular in the framework of OSCE.

Views also diverged about the best venue in which to advance these discussions. Some recommended utilizing existing tools and institutions, including international organizations such as the United Nations (e.g., by getting the self-determination item back on the agenda of the General Assembly), and regional organizations such as OSCE and the European Union. Others, however, advocated for a continued conversation about the principles in an informal, outside setting before aiming for more formalized discussions inside international organizations.

Concrete ideas and recommendations for moving forward included:

In a diplomatic context

- Organize a meeting at the United Nations with representatives of States, self-determination movements and civil society from across the globe with the goal of conceptualizing and drafting normative principles which outline general guidelines on how to evaluate self-determination claims.
- Organize an OSCE high-level meeting with the goal of confirming the Helsinki Act and formulating a new principle: an obligation for all European States to reconcile territorial integrity and self-determination.
- Work with mediators and various mediation support units in international and regional organizations to craft guidelines for mediation professionals about specifics of engagement in negotiation processes dealing with self-determination claims. In particular, focus on: identifying techniques for keeping the momentum and maintaining the engagement of parties in prolonged negotiations processes, finding ways to enable engagement of Governments with self-determination movements through third parties, cataloguing the stages and intensity of self-determination claims, navigating the inclusion of all segments of society including civil society and encouraging information-sharing and joint analysis among many groups offering mediation support and facilitation.
- Outline ways for practical application of the proposed Liechtenstein Convention, especially in situations marked by the lack of an amenable constitution following peace negotiations, weak rule of law and/or a lacking sense of national solidarity/community or willingness to accept decentralization based on legal standings.
- Encourage regional organizations, especially in Europe (i.e., OSCE), to draw on the existing treaties, recommendations (e.g., Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life) and mechanisms (e.g., Commissioner for Minorities, Council of Europe Framework) to mobilize these tools in order to address existing issues.

In an academic context

- Invest in surveys and polls about the views of local populations in territories with self-determination aspirations, especially those affected by violence, in an attempt to amplify their voice in the settlement negotiations.
- Bring together a group of international lawyers and experts to look into the conceptual contradictions between territorial integrity and self-determination, given that territorial integrity has typically been given priority in discussions.
- Produce a handbook outlining best practices from past peace negotiations involving self-determination claims. Focus in particular on issues recurring in different situations, such as: division of governance competencies, fiscal organization, rights of minorities and cross-border integration. This would assist mediators, officials from international organizations, State officials and even self-determination movements.
- Examine the concept of self-determination in discussions through various lenses, including gender, the Internet and technology (i.e., "virtual self-determination"), multigenerational views and religion, in order to gain new insights into the concept's meaning and application.
- Sponsor a course about self-determination in order to familiarize the next generation with the concept. Such an initiative could capitalize on the location of the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. The course should be co-taught by policy practitioners and academics to expand the debate beyond academia.
- Further explore the idea and definition of "people(s)" in theory and practice through seminars, with a view to clarifying these parameters in international law.
- Initiate discussions about the situation of displaced persons and refugees in situations involving self-determination claims, in particular return, compensation and relocation.